Mortgage Banking Update - March 10, 2022
In This Issue:
- CFPB, Federal Banking Agencies, and Other Federal Agencies Issue Interagency Statement on Special Purpose Credit Programs Under the Equal Credit Opportunity Act and Regulation B.
- CFPB SBREFA Panel Outline on AVM Rulemaking Addresses Potential for Algorithmic Bias In Home Valuations
- CFPB Issues Factsheet Addressing Prepaid Interest for Certain QM Loan APR Calculations
- CFPB Files Another Status Report in Section 1071 Rulemaking Lawsuit; Republican Lawmakers Send Letter to Director Chopra on Rulemaking and Introduce Bills to Amend ECOA
- Podcast: The Business of Cryptocurrency - A Discussion of Key Regulatory Issues
- FTC Issues Annual ECOA Report to CFPB
- Utah Legislature Passes Consumer Privacy Law
- En Banc Fifth Circuit Remands Case Challenging FHFA’s Constitutionality to District Court to Decide if Fannie Mae/Freddie Mac Shareholders Are Entitled to Relief
- Pennsylvania Federal District Court Rules Public Records Vendor Is Consumer Reporting Agency Subject to Fair Credit Reporting Act
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The CFPB’s Fair Lending Director, together with senior officials from other federal agencies, have sent a letter to The Appraisal Foundation (TAF) commenting on proposed changes to the Uniform Standards of Professional Appraisal Practice (USPAP). (TAF is a private, non-governmental organization that sets professional standards for appraisers.) The other agencies joining in the letter are the Federal Reserve Board, Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, National Credit Union Administration, Department of Housing and Urban Development, Federal Housing Finance Agency, and Department of Justice.
In a blog post about the letter, the CFPB states that it has seen TAF “fail to include clear warnings about the requirements of federal law in the standards it sets, and in the training it provides for appraisers.” According to the CFPB, “TAF has yet to highlight these important laws even though it frequently revises its standards.” The CFPB expresses concern “that some appraisers may be unaware of these federal discrimination bans” and urges TAF “to provide clear guidance on the existing legal standards as they relate to appraisal bias.” The CFPB also states that it is “deeply troubled by the discriminatory statements the Federal Housing Finance Agency recently identified in some home appraisals, and the appraisal disparities for communities and borrowers of color recently found in both Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae studies.”
In the letter, the agencies urge TAF to provide a “full presentation” of the anti-discrimination prohibitions in the Fair Housing Act and the Equal Credit Opportunity Act as they relate to appraisal bias. The agencies claim that while the Appraisal Standards Board Ethics Rule and Advisory Opinion 16 state that an appraiser cannot rely on “unsupported conclusions relating to [protected characteristics],” these items “do not prohibit an appraiser from relying on “supported conclusions” based on such characteristics “and, therefore, suggest that such reliance may be permissible.” As an example of how prohibited discrimination can occur in the appraisal context, the agencies indicate that “an appraiser’s use of or reliance on conclusions based on protected characteristics, regardless of whether the appraiser believes the conclusions are supportable, constitutes illegal discrimination.”
The CFPB notes in its blog post that it is reviewing the findings of a report funded by the Federal Financial Institutions Examination Council’s Appraisal Subcommittee titled “Identifying Bias and Barriers, Promoting Equity: An Analysis of the USPAP Standards and Appraiser Qualifications Criteria.” According to the CFPB, the report “raises serious concerns regarding existing appraisal standards and provides recommendations with respect to fairness, equity, objectivity, and diversity in appraisals and the training and credentialing of appraisers.”
The CFPB also notes its continuing participation in the Interagency Task Force on Property Appraisal and Valuation Equity, which was created by the Biden Administration.
The CFPB recently issued an outline entitled Small Business Advisory Review Panel for Automated Valuation Model (AVM) Rulemaking. While the outline addresses an upcoming joint rulemaking to implement quality control requirements for AVMs, the CFPB specifically focuses on the potential for AVMs to pose fair lending risks to homebuyers and homeowners. The CFPB issued the outline pursuant to a requirement under the Small Business Regulatory Enforcement Fairness Act that it collect small entities’ advice and recommendations on the potential impacts on small entities of proposals under consideration and feedback on regulatory alternatives to minimize these impacts.
The Dodd-Frank Act amended the Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act (FIRREA) to provide for a joint rulemaking to require that AVMs meet quality control standards designed to: (1) ensure a high level of confidence in the estimates produced by automated valuation models, (2) protect against the manipulation of data, (3) seek to avoid conflicts of interest, (4) require random sample testing and reviews, and (5) account for any other such factor that the agencies determine to be appropriate. In addition to the CFPB, the other agencies required to engage in the rulemaking are the Comptroller of the Currency, Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, Federal Housing Finance Agency, Federal Reserve Board and National Credit Union Administration. The CFPB’s version of the joint rule will apply to non-depository institutions.
In the outline, the CFPB indicates that it is considering proposing, pursuant to the fifth quality control factor noted above, a requirement that covered institutions establish policies, practices, procedures, and control systems to ensure that their AVMs comply with applicable nondiscrimination laws. In announcing the outline, the CFPB stated that overvaluing homes can put family wealth at-risk, create reselling challenges, and lead to higher rates of foreclosure. The CFPB also stated that “[l]ow valuations can jeopardize home sales and prevent homeowners from refinancing, which makes it harder to build wealth or make repairs. Systematically low valuations driven by biased appraisers may exacerbate existing disparities in the housing market.” Focusing on AVMs, the CFPB stated “[c]omputer models and algorithms are additional tools for mortgage lenders and appraisers to improve valuation accuracy. However, automated valuation models can pose fair lending risks to homebuyers and homeowners. The CFPB is particularly concerned that without proper safeguards, flawed versions of these models could digitally redline certain neighborhoods and further embed and perpetuate historical lending, wealth, and home value disparities.”
With regard to the adoption of a specific quality control factor addressing discrimination concerns, the CFPB seeks input on whether it should adopt an approach that would provide covered entities with flexibility to design fair lending policies, practices, procedures, and control systems tailored to their business model, or adopt an approach that would be more prescriptive and include specific requirements. The CFPB also seeks input on whether the adoption of a specific nondiscrimination factor is unnecessary because compliance with applicable nondiscrimination laws with respect to AVMs is already encompassed within three of the first four statutory quality control factors noted above that require a high level of confidence in the estimates produced by AVMs, protection against the manipulation of data, and random sample testing and reviews.
The CFPB must receive written feedback from small entity representatives by April 8, 2022, in order for the feedback to be considered and incorporated into the Small Business Review Panel Report. The CFPB requests that other stakeholders wanting to provide written feedback do so no later than May 13, 2022.
The CFPB recently issued a factsheet addressing how prepaid interest, also referred to as per diem interest, factors into the calculation of the annual percentage rate (APR) for certain adjustable rate mortgage (ARM) loans and step-rate loans for purposes of assessing qualified mortgage (QM) loan status under the revised general QM rule. The advice provided by the CFPB appears to be better suited for a rule than a factsheet.
As previously reported in December 2020, the CFPB issued a final rule to replace the original general QM based on a strict 43 percent debt-to-income (DTI) ratio with a revised general QM based on a pricing construct. For most mortgage loans, the loan qualifies as a QM under the revised general QM approach if it satisfies the product restrictions and applicable points and fees limit, and has an APR that does not exceed the average prime offer rate (a market-based interest rate) by 2.25 or more percentage points. (Higher thresholds apply for lower balance and junior lien loans.) The revised general QM basically substitutes the APR limit for the DTI limit. Also, as previously reported, the CFPB subsequently delayed the mandatory compliance date for the revised general QM from July 1, 2021, to October 1, 2022. For applications received before October 1, 2022, both the original general QM and revised general QM are available. For applications received on or after October 1, 2022, only the revised general QM remains available.
For an ARM loan or step-rate loan that provides for an increase in the interest rate during the five year period following the first scheduled payment due on the loan, the actual APR used for disclosure purposes is not used to determine if the APR on the loan is below the applicable threshold to qualify as a QM loan. Rather, the APR for such purposes must be calculated as if the highest interest rate that could apply during such five-year period is in effect for the entire loan term. In the factsheet, the CFPB addresses how prepaid interest is factored into the special APR calculation.
The CFPB notes in the factsheet that interest on mortgage loans is paid in arrears. For example, for a monthly mortgage loan payment due on November 1, the payment will include interest that accrued during October. The CFPB also addresses two approaches used in the industry to address interest that accrues during the month in which a loan is closed. Using an example of a loan that closes on September 20 with an initial payment due on November 1, the CFPB indicates that the consumer typically will pay at closing prepaid interest for the 11 days during the month of September in which interest will accrue. Conversely, using an example of a loan that closes on October 4 with an initial payment due on November 1, the CFPB indicates that the creditor typically will credit the consumer for three days of interest, addressing that the loan was not outstanding until October 4.
Whether the consumer pays prepaid interest, or the creditor provides the consumer with an interest credit, the payment or credit are included in the determination of the APR. In the factsheet, the CFPB addresses which rate of interest is used for the special APR calculation for an ARM loan or step-rate loan that provides for an increase in the interest rate during the five year period following the first scheduled payment due on the loan. The CFPB advises as follows:
For purposes of calculating the APR for the General QM ARMs special rule, the maximum interest rate that may apply during the five-year period after the date on which the first regular periodic payment will be due is used to calculate prepaid interest and negative prepaid interest. For example, if Ficus Bank is originating an ARM that has an interest rate of 2.5 percent in years one through three and 4.5 percent for the remainder of the loan term, Ficus Bank must use 4.5 percent as the interest rate when determining if the loan satisfies the price-based General QM definition, including for calculating any prepaid interest or negative prepaid interest as part of the APR calculation. A creditor must use the maximum interest rate in the first five years for calculating the APR for purposes of the special rule, even if the creditor will use a different rate for calculating prepaid interest due at consummation.
Thus, for the applicable ARM loans or step rate loans, for purposes of the special APR calculation used to determine QM status, the actual charge or credit for prepaid interest based on the initial interest rate is not used. Rather, the highest rate that can apply during the initial five-year period is used. The CFPB provided no explanation for using that rate and not the initial interest rate, which is the rate that is used to determine the actual prepaid interest charge or credit at closing. Further, as noted above, the guidance would appear to be more suited to a rulemaking than a factsheet.
On February 22, 2022, the CFPB filed its eighth status report with the California federal district court hearing the lawsuit brought by the California Reinvestment Coalition, National Association for Latino Community Asset Builders, and two individual plaintiffs in 2019. The purpose of the suit was to force the Bureau to issue a proposal implementing the small business data requirements of Section 1071 of the Dodd-Frank Act of 2010, after years of delay.
The status report reiterates the fact that the CFPB has met the deadlines to date under the Stipulated Settlement Agreement with the plaintiffs, including issuing the Small Business Regulatory Enforcement Fairness Act (SBREFA) outline on September 15, 2020; convening a SBREFA panel on October 15, 2020; and completing the SBREFA report on December 14, 2020. Most recently, the Bureau met the deadline for issuance of the Section 1071 notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM), which was due on September 30, 2021, but published slightly earlier on September 1, 2021. The status report indicates that the comment period on the NPRM closed on January 6, 2022, the Bureau currently is reviewing the approximately 2,100 comments that were submitted, and the Bureau will confer with the plaintiffs regarding an appropriate deadline for issuing a final rule.
The CFPB’s Section 1071 rulemaking is the subject of a letter dated February 16, 2022 sent to Director Chopra by three Republican Congressmen: Blaine Luetkemeyer, Roger Williams, and French Hill. In the letter, the lawmakers:
- Assert that the thresholds for the NPRM’s activity-based exemption and small business definition are too stringent and “would drastically impact the ability of small institutions to make loans to small businesses and decrease access to credit for minority-owned, women-owned, and small businesses.” (In the NPRM, the CFPB is proposing an activity-based exemption that would exempt financial institutions that originate less than 25 “covered credit transactions” to “small businesses” in each of the two preceding calendar years. It also is proposing to define a “small business” as one that had $5 million or less in gross annual revenue for its preceding fiscal year.)
- Seek a longer implementation period for the final rule than the 18-month period proposed in the NPRM.
- Seek the removal of the requirement in the NPRM for a financial institution, if an applicant does not provide any ethnicity, rate, or sex information for at least one principal owner, to collect at least one principal owner’s race and ethnicity (but not sex) via visual observation and/or surname if the financial institution meets in person with any principal owners (including meetings via electronic media with an enabled video component.)
- Seek a determination by the CFPB in a separate rulemaking regarding what information collected pursuant to Section 1071 will be made public. (Section 1071 requires publication of the data collected but gives the Bureau authority to “delete or modify” data to be made publicly available if the Bureau determines the deletion or modification would advance privacy interests. In the NPRM, the Bureau indicated that it would issue a policy statement outlining what modifications and deletions would be made to the data after one full year of Section 1071 reporting.)
The lawmakers also have introduced the following three bills to address the concerns set forth in their letter to Director Chopra:
- Small Lenders Exempt from New Data and Excessive Reporting Act, H.R. 6732.The bill would create an activity-based exemption that would exempt financial institutions that originate less than 500 “covered credit transactions” to “small businesses” in each of the two preceding calendar years, define a “small business” as one that had $1 million or less in gross annual revenue for its preceding fiscal year, and create a 3-year implementation period for a final rule.
- Business Loan Privacy Act, H.R. 6739. The bill would require the Bureau to engage in rulemaking to establish the modifications and deletions it will make to Section 1071 data and how such modifications and deletions will advance a privacy interest.
- Preventing Racial Profiling in Lending Act, H.R. 6802. The text is not yet available. However, according to a letter to the three lawmakers from the Independent Community Bankers of America in support of the three bills, the bill is intended to block the Bureau from requiring a financial institution to collect race and ethnicity information based on visual observation and/or surname.
In addition to discussing what cryptocurrency is, we look at some of the regulatory rules that apply to this increasingly popular but complicated financial instrument, including registration and compliance program requirements, and consider how crypto exchanges, financial institutions, and other businesses should address crypto transactions involving unhosted digital wallets and requirements for the identification and reporting of counter-parties to transactions.
Mike Robotti, a partner in Ballard Spahr’s White Collar and Internal Investigations Group hosts the conversation, joined by Peter Hardy and Marjorie Peerce, partners in the Group.
Click here to listen to the podcast.
On February 4, 2022, the FTC sent its annual letter to the CFPB reporting on the FTC’s activities related to the Equal Credit Opportunity Act (ECOA) and Regulation B. The Bureau includes the FTC’s annual letter in its own annual report to Congress on the ECOA.
The FTC has authority to enforce the ECOA and Regulation B with respect to nonbank financial service providers within its jurisdiction. The letter notes that, consistent with the Dodd-Frank Act, the FTC continues to coordinate certain ECOA enforcement, rulemaking, and other activities with the CFPB pursuant to a memorandum of understanding with the Bureau.
With regard to fair lending enforcement, the letter highlights only one development, the filing of an amicus brief jointly with the CFPB, FTC, DOJ, and Federal Reserve Board in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit in Fralish v. Bank of America One, N.A. The brief urges the court to reverse a district court ruling that an individual who had already received credit from the defendant and who was not currently applying to the defendant for credit was not an “applicant” for purposes of the ECOA’s adverse action notice requirement. According to the agencies, the ECOA’s text, history, and purpose make clear that the ECOA’s protections extend to existing borrowers.
With regard to fair lending research and policy development, the letter discusses (1) a report issued by the FTC in 2021 that looked at differences in the way that fraud and other consumer problems affect communities of color, (2) the FTC Military Task Force’s continuation of its work on military consumer protection issues and the FTC staff’s role as a liaison to the American Bar Association’s Standing Committee on Legal Assistance for Military Personnel which supports initiatives to deliver legal assistance and services to servicemembers, veterans, and their families, and (3) the FTC’s continuation of its (a) service as a member of the Interagency Task Force on Fair Lending along with the CFPB, DOJ, HUD and the federal banking agencies, and (b) participation in the Interagency Fair Lending Methodologies Working Group which consists of staff members from the FTC, CFPB, DOJ, HUD, federal banking agencies, and the Federal Housing Finance Agency.
With regard to fair lending consumer and business education, the letter discusses the FTC’s “efforts to provide education on significant issues to which Regulation B pertains.” The efforts described consist of one blog post for consumers published by the FTC for consumers and two blog posts published for businesses.
Following the lead of California, Colorado, and Virginia, Utah is set to become the fourth state to pass a comprehensive privacy law.
As of March 4, the Utah Consumer Privacy Act (SB 227) cleared both houses of the Utah legislature. The UCPA closely resembles the Virginia Consumer Data Privacy Act, but with some interesting changes. The law applies to controllers or processors that do business in Utah, or produce a product or service that is targeted to consumers who are Utah residents; have annual revenue of $25 million or more; and either (a) control or process personal data of 100,000 or more consumers in Utah during a calendar year, or (b) derive over 50 percent of the entity’s gross revenue from the sale of personal data and control or process the personal data of 25,000 or more consumers. The law does not include a private right of action; rather, it will be enforced by the Utah AG. If signed, the law will go into effect December 31, 2023.
The law would vest consumers with rights such as the right to confirm whether a controller is processing their personal data, access and deletion rights, and opt-out rights. The law would require controllers and processors to provide notice that (1) identifies categories of and purposes for which personal data are processed, (2) informs consumers how they may exercise a right, (3) categories of personal data the controller shares with third parties, and (4) the categories of third parties with whom the controller shares personal data.
The law also includes a 30-day right to cure. Moreover, the law neither vests the AG with rulemaking authority, nor does it provide consumers the ability to opt-out of processing using a global privacy control.
While the Utah law will likely not significantly change compliance requirements for businesses subject to the California, Colorado, or Virginia laws, it will create new obligations for some companies. It also serves as a reminder that states will continue to take different approaches, expanding the patchwork of varying legal requirements in the privacy field.
In Collins v. Yellin (previously captioned Collins v. Mnuchin), the U.S. Supreme Court, relying on its decision in Seila Law, held that the Federal Housing Finance Agency’s structure was unconstitutional because the Housing and Economic Recovery Act of 2008 (HERA) only allowed the President to remove the FHFA’s Director “for cause.” Despite ruling that the FHFA’s structure was unconstitutional, the Supreme Court also held that the proper remedy for the constitutional violation was not to invalidate the FHFA actions challenged by the plaintiffs. However, the Supreme Court indicated that the plaintiffs might nevertheless be entitled to retrospective relief if they could show that the unconstitutional removal provision caused harm. The Supreme Court remanded the case to the lower courts to resolve in the first instance whether the provision caused such harm.
The plaintiffs in Collins were shareholders of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac seeking to invalidate an amendment (Third Amendment) to a preferred stock agreement between the Treasury Department and the FHFA as conservator for Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. The Third Amendment was adopted by an Acting FHFA Director and subsequent actions to implement the Third Amendment were taken by Senate-confirmed Directors. The Supreme Court agreed to review the en banc Fifth Circuit’s decision which reversed the district court and held that that the FHFA’s structure was unconstitutional.
Now, on remand from the Supreme Court, the en banc Fifth Circuit has issued a decision remanding the case back to the district court to decide whether the plaintiffs suffered compensable harm from the unconstitutional removal provision. Four Fifth Circuit judges dissented from the majority decision, stating that nothing in the Supreme Court’s decision precluded the Fifth Circuit from deciding the harm issue and that the en banc Fifth Circuit “could easily do so” in light of its previous conclusion that the President could have acted to stop the dividend payments required by the Third Amendment but had not done so. According to the dissent, because the plaintiffs had not pointed to sufficient facts to cast doubt on this conclusion, the en banc Fifth Circuit should modify the district court’s judgment by granting declaratory relief in the plaintiffs’ favor stating that HERA’s “for cause” removal provision was unconstitutional and affirming the district court in all other respects, which ruled that the plaintiffs were not entitled to relief with regard to the Third Amendment.
A Pennsylvania district court has ruled that a company that provides reports based on a search of public records is a “consumer reporting agency” (CRA) as defined by the Fair Credit Reporting Act.
In McGrath v. Credit Lenders Service Agency, Inc., the plaintiffs applied to a bank for a loan to refinance their home mortgage. The bank engaged Credit Lenders Service Agency (CLSA) to conduct a public records search on the plaintiffs and provide a report. To prepare a report, CLSA subcontracted with people who go to various record repositories (e.g. directories of open judgments and municipal liens maintained by courts) to conduct a physical search and send the results to CLSA. CLSA’s report to the bank about the plaintiffs erroneously listed outstanding civil judgments against them. The plaintiffs claimed that they contacted CLSA which refused to investigate the alleged inaccuracies.
The plaintiffs sued CLSA, alleging that it violated the FCRA by failing to follow reasonable procedures to assure maximum possible accuracy when preparing a consumer report (15 U.S.C. Sec. 1681e(b)) and by failing to conduct a reasonable reinvestigation of the plaintiffs’ dispute (15 U.S.C. Sec. 1681i(a)). CLSA moved for summary judgment, asserting that it was not subject to the FCRA as a matter of law because it was not a CRA and did not supply “consumer reports” within the meaning of the FCRA. It also asserted that even if it was subject to the FCRA, no reasonable juror could find that it violated either FCRA provision.
As an initial matter, the district court found that CLSA was a CRA. In doing so, it rejected CLSA’s argument that an entity can only be a CRA if it issues “consumer reports.” Based on the FCRA definitions of the terms CRA and “consumer report,” the district court concluded that to be a CRA, an entity does not actually have to furnish “consumer reports” but instead must act for the purpose of furnishing “consumer reports.” Thus, an entity could be a CRA if it acted for the purpose of furnishing “consumer reports” even if it never produced a report or the intended report is determined not to be a “consumer report.” Stated differently, “the Court does not need to determine that an entity actually produced a ‘consumer report’ to find that it is a [CRA].” However, the court indicated that the opposite was not true, meaning the FCRA’s definition of “consumer report” does require the report to come from a CRA.
Turning to the issue of whether CLSA was a CRA, the court found that CLSA’s operations satisfied the elements of the FCRA definition. In addition to receiving monetary fees and using interstate commerce, the other elements of the CRA definition require an entity to regularly engage in the practice of assembling or evaluating consumer credit information or other information on consumers for the purpose of furnishing consumer reports to third parties. CLSA argued that it was not “assembling” information but had only accessed records of open judgments on the court’s database that were assembled by the court. The court rejected this argument, finding that the judgments were only a portion of the report, which included other information such as outstanding mortgages, home value, and other outstanding liens. According to the court, “assembling” does not require the changing of contents but only requires the gathering and grouping of information. The court also found that CLSA’s reports were “consumer reports” for purposes of the FCRA.
With regard to CLSA’s alleged FCRA violations, the court was unwilling to grant summary judgment in favor of CLSA on the plaintiffs’ claim that CLSA had negligently violated Section 1681e(b) by failing to follow reasonable procedures to assure maximum possible accuracy when preparing consumer reports. Among the elements that must be established to prove a Section 1681e(b) violation is that inaccurate information was included in a consumer report due to a CRA’s failure to follow reasonable procedures. The district court refused to follow the Seventh Circuit’s 1994 decision in Henson v. CSC Credit Services, which held that as a matter of law, a CRA does not violate the FCRA by reporting inaccurate information obtained from a court’s judgment docket absent prior notice from the consumer that the information may be inaccurate. According to the court, Third Circuit decisions had made clear that the reasonableness of a CRA’s procedures is a jury question and because there was evidence that CLSA took no steps to check the accuracy of the information it provides to customers and CLSA had not introduced evidence to show that its procedures were reasonable, a reasonable jury could find its procedures were unreasonable.
The court did, however, grant summary judgment in favor of CLSA on the plaintiffs’ claims that CLSA had willfully violated Section 1681e(b) and that it had negligently and willfully violated Section 1681i(a) by failing to conduct a reasonable reinvestigation of the plaintiffs’ dispute. According to the court, based on Henson and the absence of direct Third Circuit precedent, CLSA’s reading of Section 1681e(b) could have reasonably found support in the courts. As a result, its Section 1681e(b) violation was not willful. As to the plaintiffs’ Section 1681i(a) claims, the court found that because there was no evidence in the record that the plaintiffs had notified CLSA of an error and requested a reinvestigation, there was no genuine dispute of material fact whether CLSA had negligently or willfully failed to conduct a reasonable reinvestigation.
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This alert is a periodic publication of Ballard Spahr LLP and is intended to notify recipients of new developments in the law. It should not be construed as legal advice or legal opinion on any specific facts or circumstances. The contents are intended for general informational purposes only, and you are urged to consult your own attorney concerning your situation and specific legal questions you have.