New York Codifies Definition of Consummation Facilitating TRID Compliance

The New York Senate has approved Bill 982, which amends state law to expressly allow for execution of a mortgage loan by electronic signature. In connection with this amendment, the term “consummation of a mortgage loan” also was codified for the first time. Prior to the bill's passage, there was no statutory definition of “consummation” and, pursuant to case law (See Murphy v. Empire of America, FSA 746 F2nd 931) consummation was deemed to occur under New York law when the consumer executes and returns the lender’s commitment letter.

Under the newly codified definition, consummation means “when the applicant for the mortgage loan executes the promissory note and mortgage including by electronic signature, in accordance with applicable federal and state laws, rules, and regulations.”

This change has implications beyond New York state law. Under Regulation Z of the Truth in Lending Act, “consummation” is defined as “the time that a consumer becomes contractually obligated on a credit transaction.” The point at which a “contractual obligation … is created” is a matter of state law. The court’s interpretation of consummation essentially placed the timing of consummation into the hands of borrowers, creating some complications as the TILA-RESPA Integrated Disclosure Rule (TRID) requires that the closing disclosure is provided no later than three business days before consummation of the transaction.

This provision is effective immediately.

- John D. Socknat and Wendy T. Novotne


FCC Cannot Require Opt-Out Notice on "Solicited" Fax Ads, D.C. Circuit Holds

The FCC's 2006 Solicited Fax Rule is unlawful to the extent that it requires opt-out notices on solicited fax advertisements, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit has held in a 2-1 ruling.

Judge Brett Kavanaugh, writing for the majority, found that the FCC's rule contravened the plain text of the Junk Fax Prevention Act (JFPA), a 2005 amendment to the Telephone Consumer Protection Act (TCPA). The Solicited Fax Rule requires a sender of a fax advertisement to include an opt-out notice on both "solicited" and "unsolicited" ads, even though the TCPA only requires such a notice to appear on unsolicited ads.

The case before the D.C. Circuit, Bais Yaakov of Spring Valley et al. v. Federal Communications Commission et al., was brought by petitioners appealing an October 2014 FCC order upholding the FCC’s opt-out notice requirement. The petitioners were defendants in various class actions alleging violations of the FCC's opt-out requirement, and had unsuccessfully sought a declaratory ruling from the FCC clarifying that the JFPA does not require an opt-out notice on solicited fax advertisements. Recognizing the magnitude of liability exposure faced by class action defendants, the court noted that one petitioner, Anda Inc., faced up to $150 million in damages for failing to include the opt-out notice required by the Solicited Fax Rule.

The TCPA prohibits the use of "any telephone facsimile machine, computer, or other device to send, to a telephone facsimile machine, an unsolicited advertisement." An "unsolicited" advertisement is "any material advertising the commercial availability or quality of any property, goods, or services which is transmitted to any person without that person's prior express invitation or permission, in writing or otherwise."

The court found that the text of the TCPA draws a distinction between solicited and unsolicited fax advertisements, and rejected the FCC's view that ambiguity in the meaning of the term "prior express invitation or permission" granted it authority under the TCPA to require opt-out notices on solicited fax ads. The FCC had argued that requiring the opt-out notice on solicited ads was an appropriate exercise of the Commission's power to implement the TCPA's provisions pertaining to unsolicited ads, allowing recipients to revoke "prior express invitation or permission." Writing for the majority, Judge Kavanaugh stated, "Congress has not authorized the FCC to require opt-out notices on solicited fax advertisements. And that is all we need to know to resolve this case."

Bais Yaakov will likely have significant implications for junk fax suits—a significant driver of litigation under the TCPA. The decision potentially opens the door to challenging judgments under the Solicited Fax Rule and should provide new challenges to class certification in fax cases. Likewise, the ruling will have immediate effects on many JFPA/TCPA actions currently pending in courts across the country.

More broadly, the outcome of Bais Yaakov may offer a preview of a less aggressive regulatory posture from the FCC on TCPA issues. Notably, in the October 2014 order clarifying the FCC's view that the opt-out notice was required on both solicited and unsolicited ads, then-Commissioner (now Chairman) Pai dissented from the FCC's position. Shortly after the release of the Bais Yaakov decision, Chairman Pai issued the following statement: "Today’s decision by the D.C. Circuit highlights the importance of the FCC adhering to the rule of law. I dissented from the FCC decision that the court has now overturned because, as I stated at the time, the agency's approach to interpreting the law reflected 'convoluted gymnastics.' The court has now agreed that the FCC acted unlawfully. Going forward, the Commission will strive to follow the law and exercise only the authority that has been granted to us by Congress."

- Alan S. Kaplinsky, Mark J. Furletti, Daniel JT McKenna, and Jeremy C. Sairsingh


OCC Issues Draft Licensing Supplement for Fintech Companies Seeking National Bank Charters

The Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC) has taken another step toward implementing its proposal to allow financial technology (Fintech) companies to apply for a special purpose national bank (SPNB) charter, issuing a draft supplement to the OCC's existing Licensing Manual.

According to the OCC, the draft supplement was informed by more than 100 comments it received on its proposal, which are summarized in a separate document issued concurrently with the supplement. While noting in its press release that it typically does not solicit comments on procedural manuals and supplements, the OCC stated that "consistent with its guiding principles of transparency and fostering open dialogue with stakeholders," it will nevertheless receive comments on the supplement until April 14, 2017.

The draft supplement describes the licensing process envisioned by the OCC for Fintech companies seeking an SPNB charter. It covers:

  • initial steps toward an SPNB charter, including initial contact with the OCC's Office of Innovation, prefiling communications with the OCC Licensing Division, and charter application filing procedures;

  • bank-permissible and core banking activities of the proposed SPNB;

  • chartering standards, including relevant policy considerations, coordination with other regulators having jurisdiction over the proposed SPNB, and the effect of prior or pending investigations or enforcement actions;

  • business plan requirements, including supplemental guidance to the Interagency Business Plan Guidelines to address how differences in the structures and business models of Fintech companies from those of traditional banks may affect a Fintech company's business plan; and

  • preliminary and final approval processes, as well as standard and special requirements that must be satisfied before final approval, or that remain in place after the bank opens for business.

Of particular note are the OCC's comments in its discussion of chartering standards that a pending investigation or enforcement action may be grounds for denial of a charter application. The OCC will coordinate as appropriate with other regulators having jurisdiction over the proposed SPNB when considering charter applications. As noted below, state regulators have expressed strong opposition to the OCC's proposal. As a result, the potential for a state enforcement action to result in the denial of a charter application could encourage state regulators to launch investigations or bring enforcement actions to block charter applications. At the same time, a Fintech company interested in obtaining a charter should consider the potential impact on its charter application of entering into a settlement where the company has possible defenses.

In its summary of the comments received on its proposal, the OCC defended its authority to charter SPNBs that do not offer FDIC-insured deposits, citing its authority to charter a bank that performs a single core banking function—receiving deposits, paying checks, or lending money. It also addressed other issues raised by commenters:

  • The OCC disagreed with commenters, including the Conference of State Bank Supervisors and the New York Department of Financial Services, which objected that a national bank charter would allow a Fintech company to avoid state consumer protection laws and make it more difficult for states to enforce such laws by removing their visitorial oversight. The OCC stated that an SPNB "would be subject to consistent federal consumer protection standards and federal supervision standards," including OCC enforcement of Section 5 of the FTC Act (which prohibits unfair or deceptive acts or practices), and observed that the Dodd-Frank Act's federal preemption standards would result in the application of state law to SPNBs in the same way and to the same extent as it applies to other national banks. Under Dodd-Frank, a state's laws are preempted if they discriminate against national banks (as compared to a bank chartered by that state) or operate to prevent or significantly interfere with the exercise of a national bank's powers. The OCC noted that, under these standards, state laws that address anti-discrimination, fair lending, debt collection, taxation, zoning, crime, and torts generally apply to national banks and would also apply to SPNBs. (We note that the proper scope of national bank preemption of state law has long been a source of debate and does not merely engender controversy with respect to SPNBs.)Regarding predatory lending concerns, the OCC cited its actions to eliminate predatory, unfair, and deceptive practices in the federal banking system and noted that federal law gives a state-chartered bank the same ability to export the usury laws of the state in which it is located as a national bank.

  • Regarding small business customers, the OCC stated that it would expect an SPNB "to provide sufficient disclosures and clear information to ensure that all borrowers, including consumers and small businesses, can make informed credit decisions" and that it would "look favorably on an applicant's commitment to educate small business borrowers about their rights and responsibilities."

  • Regarding financial inclusion concerns, the OCC stated that "[t]o help ensure that [the significant potential of Fintech companies to expand access to financial services] is realized, the OCC would expect a formal commitment to, and plan for, financial inclusion from SPNBs engaged in lending activities or providing financial services to consumers or small businesses." The business plan submitted with a charter application must contain a Financial Inclusion Plan (FIP) section as described in Appendix B of the draft supplement. Charter applications are subject to a 30-day public comment period, and the FIP will be included in a public file of the charter application that is maintained by the OCC and provided to any person upon request and also published on the OCC website.

  • Regarding capital requirements, the OCC acknowledged that its minimum capital requirements for national banks "may not be sufficient for measuring capital adequacy for some SPNBs" and that in those cases, it will use "alternative approaches to determine the appropriate capital requirement." The OCC's approach will likely require SPNBs to provide more capital as compared to banks since it will consider an SPNB's off-balance-sheet exposure. In response to comments urging the OCC to require SPNBs to assess their liquidity needs over a full credit cycle that includes both normal and stressed conditions, the OCC noted its awareness that many companies and business models have not yet operated in stressed conditions. The OCC stated that it would therefore expect a charter applicant "to consider and address, among other items, projected borrowing capacity under normal and adverse market conditions." It also stated that, like other national banks, SPNBs should create comprehensive contingency funding plans.

  • Regarding concerns about eroding the traditional separation of banking and commerce, the OCC stated that it will not approve charter proposals that would result in the "inappropriate commingling" of banking and commerce.

The OCC's draft licensing supplement makes clear that the charter process for Fintech companies will not be easy and that companies that become SPNBs will be subject to intense regulatory scrutiny at the federal level and potentially steep capital and liquidity requirements. To meet regulatory expectations, an SPNB will need to demonstrate compliance with applicable laws and regulations, including Bank Secrecy Act/anti-money laundering/Office of Foreign Assets economic sanctions requirements, fair lending laws, and other applicable consumer protection laws and regulations.

However, for lenders that can become SPNBs and would otherwise confront a multitude of state lending restrictions, a charter may have substantial appeal. An SPNB could export a uniform interest rate nationwide from the state where it is located, avoid state licensing requirements, examinations, and other exercises of "visitorial authority," and disregard state laws that prevent or significantly interfere with the exercise of their powers under federal law. Given the likely distinctions between the activities of SPNBs that make and sell loans and the situation addressed by the Second Circuit in Madden v. Midland Funding, this preemption of state usury law could well extend to companies that purchase loans from SPNBs.

While one side of the political spectrum has criticized the OCC's proposal for undermining consumer protections, the other side has criticized it for imposing undue restrictions on SPNBs. Thus, it remains unclear whether, when, and in what form the proposal will ultimately be implemented. Recognizing this reality and the further reality that the proposal will not be useful or available for all Fintech companies, Alan S. Kaplinsky, Practice Leader of Ballard Spahr's Consumer Financial Services Group, recently urged the OCC to adopt a rule to take issue with Madden. While Comptroller Thomas J. Curry has expressed reluctance to do so in the midst of ongoing litigation, Mr. Kaplinsky has argued that there is clear OCC and U.S. Supreme Court precedent to support the OCC's issuance of an interpretive opinion or rule in this circumstance.

On April 18, 2017, from 12 p.m. to 1 p.m. ET, Ballard Spahr will conduct a webinar, "The OCC's Licensing Manual Supplement: What It Means for Fintech Companies Seeking National Bank Charters." A link to register is available here.

- The Consumer Financial Services and Mortgage Banking Groups


New York’s "No Credit Card Surcharge" Law Regulates Speech, SCOTUS Rules

New York's law prohibiting merchants from imposing a surcharge on credit card purchases (Section 518 of the state's General Business Law) regulates speech, thereby making the law subject to First Amendment scrutiny, the U.S. Supreme Court has ruled in Expressions Hair Design v. Schneiderman. The Second Circuit had concluded that Section 518 did not violate the First Amendment because it only regulates pricing, not speech. The Supreme Court vacated that decision and remanded the case to the Second Circuit to assess the law's constitutionality.

The plaintiffs in Expressions Hair Design were five merchants and their owners, who used or sought to use one of two pricing schemes: a "single-sticker-price" scheme in which a merchant posts a single cash price for its goods and services but indicates an additional amount is added for credit card customers, and a "dual-price" scheme in which a merchant posts two different prices—one for credit card customers and one for cash customers. The plaintiffs alleged that by prohibiting their use of a "single-sticker-price scheme" or restricting how they describe the price differential in a "dual-price" scheme, Section 518 violates the First Amendment because it regulates how they communicate their prices.

The Second Circuit agreed that Section 518 would prohibit the plaintiffs from using a "single-sticker-price" scheme but concluded the law does not implicate the First Amendment because it only regulates a pricing practice by requiring the “sticker price” and the price charged to a credit card user to be equal. It does not, however, prohibit merchants from offering a discount to cash customers or referring to a credit-cash price differential as a credit card surcharge. The Second Circuit abstained from ruling on whether Section 518 would apply to a "dual-price" scheme.

Writing for the Supreme Court (and joined by Justices Kennedy, Thomas, Ginsburg, and Kagan), Chief Justice Roberts indicated that the Court limited its review to whether Section 518 was unconstitutional as applied to the plaintiffs' desired "single-sticker-price" scheme. Accepting the Second Circuit's determination that Section 518 bars such a pricing scheme, the Supreme Court disagreed with the Second Circuit's conclusion that Section 518 regulates conduct, not speech. According to the Supreme Court, Section 518 is "not like a typical price regulation," such as one that regulates the amount a merchant can charge for a product. In the Court's view, Section 518 is different because it "tells merchants nothing about the amount they are allowed to collect from a cash or credit payer," and, instead, "[w]hat the law does regulate is how sellers may communicate their prices." Because the Second Circuit had not considered whether, as a speech regulation, Section 518 survived First Amendment scrutiny as a valid restriction on commercial speech or a disclosure requirement, the Supreme Court remanded for the Second Circuit to do so.

Justice Sotomayor, in an opinion joined by Justice Alito that concurred only in the judgment but not as to whether Section 518 regulates speech, stated that the Second Circuit abused its discretion by not certifying to the New York Court of Appeals the question of what pricing schemes are prohibited by Section 518. While observing that the Supreme Court's opinion did not "foreclose the Second Circuit from choosing that route on remand," she stated that she would have remanded the case with directions to certify the case to the New York Court of Appeals for "a definitive interpretation" of Section 518. Justice Breyer, while agreeing in his concurring opinion that Section 518 regulates speech and that remand was appropriate, wrote that certification to the New York Court of Appeals "may well be helpful."

In 2015, a divided 11th Circuit panel ruled that Florida's "no surcharge" law is an unconstitutional abridgement of free speech, and in 2016, a divided Fifth Circuit panel rejected a First Amendment challenge to Texas's "no surcharge" law on the grounds that it regulates pricing and only incidentally implicates speech. Further review of the prohibitions imposed by the state laws at issue in those cases is needed to determine whether they would be considered to regulate speech under the Supreme Court’s analysis in Expressions Hair Design. In addition to Florida, New York, and Texas, California, Colorado, Connecticut, Kansas, Maine, Massachusetts, and Oklahoma have "no surcharge" laws.

- Alan S. Kaplinsky, John L. Culhane, Jr., Scott M. Pearson, and Marjorie J. Peerce


PLI’s “The CFPB Speaks” panel discussion

Ballard Spahr Partner Alan S. Kaplinsky moderated the panel "The CFPB Speaks" at the Practising Law Institute's 22nd Annual Consumer Financial Services Institute in New York City. Mr. Kaplinsky, practice leader of Ballard Spahr's Consumer Financial Services Group, was co-chair of the March 27, 2017, event.

The panel included senior CFPB lawyers Anthony Alexis, Assistant Director for Enforcement;  Diane Thompson, Deputy Assistant Director, Office of Regulations; and Peggy Twohig, Assistant Director for Supervision Policy. Ballard Spahr attorney James Kim, a former senior CFPB enforcement lawyer who now represents the industry, was also a panel member.

In response to questions posed by Mr. Kaplinsky and audience members, the CFPB lawyers discussed regulatory, supervisory, and enforcement developments and upcoming initiatives. Particularly noteworthy comments were:

  • Ms. Twohig stressed the importance of an entity’s response to a PARR letter—a notice of Potential Action and Request for Response—in the supervisory process. She commented that there have been instances where the CFPB has decided not to cite a company for a violation based on its response to a PARR letter.

  • Mr. Alexis and Ms. Twohig discussed the CFPB’s process for deciding whether the CFPB will use a supervisory or an enforcement action to address violations found in an examination. Ms. Twohig indicated that the decision whether to refer a matter to enforcement is made by an Action Review Committee (ARC), which considers various factors such as the severity of the violation, the entity’s cooperation with the CFPB, and policy factors that include the need for the CFPB to send a public message of deterrence. Mr. Alexis indicated that if a matter is referred to enforcement, the Enforcement Division will consider similar factors as well as input from witnesses obtained through CIDs. Enforcement will then decide whether to proceed with an enforcement action, return the matter for supervisory resolution (which Mr. Alexis called a “reverse ARC” process), or drop the case. Mr. Alexis acknowledged that a supervisory resolution through an MOU or similar agreement is the only vehicle available to the CFPB to enter into a non-public settlement. Accordingly, if a company is not subject to CFPB supervision, a settlement can only be entered into through a public consent order.

  • Mr. Alexis indicated that the constitutional challenge to the CFPB’s use of an administrative judge in the PHH case has not caused the CFPB to direct more enforcement matters to lawsuits filed in federal district court rather than administrative proceedings. He noted that the CFPB’s decision of which forum to use is frequently driven by the facts involved in a matter, with a district court lawsuit more likely to be filed when the CFPB is in need of more discovery to support its case. He also indicated that the panel’s rejection in PHH of the CFPB’s position that it is not bound by statutes of limitation in administrative enforcement actions has not changed the CFPB’s approach to enforcement matters.

  • Mr. Alexis indicated that he saw no need to advocate for the CFPB’s adoption of a matrix for assessing civil money penalties similar to those used by the prudential regulators because the factors are laid out in Dodd-Frank.

  • Ms. Thompson declined to estimate when the CFPB is likely to issue a final arbitration rule or a final payday/small dollar loan rule, stating that it was “too speculative” for her to do so and that the CFPB was continuing to consider the unprecedented number of comments received on both rules. She also indicated that the CFPB was in the early stages of developing a proposed rule to implement Dodd-Frank Section 1071. (Section 1071 amended the ECOA to require financial institutions to collect and maintain certain data in connection with credit applications made by women- or minority-owned businesses and small businesses. Such data include the race, sex, and ethnicity of the principal owners of the business.) According to Ms. Thompson, the CFPB is attempting to address the absence of good sources of data on small business lending.

  • Ms. Twohig indicated that the CFPB’s next larger participant rule will deal with consumer installment lending and auto title loans and that the CFPB is continuing to consider creating a registration system for non-bank lenders to assist the CFPB in identifying market participants. She also indicated that to address the widespread use of compliance technology solutions by entities it supervises, the CFPB has stood up the National Information Systems Supervision Program (NISSP). Through the NISSP, the CFPB uses specialized managers to inform and focus supervisory reviews of entities’ compliance-related information systems, some of which are designed in-house but many of which rely upon third parties to develop and maintain.

  • Ms. Twohig defended the CFPB’s proposed rule that would amend its information disclosure rules to allow it to share confidential supervisory information with any federal or state agency (including state attorneys general) regardless of whether the agency has jurisdiction over the company whose CSI is shared as long as the CSI is “relevant” to the agency’s authority.

  • Mr. Alexis stated that the CFPB’s decision to assert that the nonbank, and not the tribal-affiliated lender, was the “true lender” in the pending CashCall case was fact-specific and dependent on how that case unfolded. Mr. Alexis said that the CFPB would consider using the “true lender” theory and the predominant economic interest test in other cases if it is appropriate. Mr. Kim remarked that the CFPB’s application of the “true lender” theory requires states to cooperate by alleging that the nonbanks, who service or collect on the loans, are violating state usury and licensing laws.

- Barbara S. Mishkin


CFPB previews 5-year review of mortgage rules

Dovetailing with President Trump’s recent Executive Order requiring a reduction in regulatory burden, on March 21, 2017, a CFPB official remarked at the American Bankers Association Government Relations Summit that the CFPB was planning to start its review of significant mortgage regulations, including the ability to repay/qualified mortgage rule.

The Dodd-Frank Act requires the CFPB to use available evidence and data to assess all of its rules five years after they go into effect to ensure they are meeting the purposes and objectives of Dodd-Frank, and the specific goals of the subject rule. January 2018 will mark five years since the ability to repay/ qualified mortgage rule was finalized, as well as other key mortgage regulations, in January 2013.

Citing this requirement and “common sense,” Chris D’Angelo, Associate Director of the CFPB’s Division of Supervision, Enforcement and Fair Lending, said that the CFPB is “embarking upon now the beginning of an assessment process for our major mortgage rules.” Mr. D’Angelo said that the CFPB would assess these rules’ “real-world effects” on the market, as well as “whether it had the effect which was intended, what the costs were, whether there’s some tailoring that would make that more effective.”

D’Angelo noted that the CFPB was still receiving complaints related to the mortgage servicing industry despite the existence of these rules, and that most of the problems were due to “the third-party service providers and the folks who develop your technology solutions.” He also stated that incentive compensation practices would be considered but noted that “We know that you need those in order to manage larger organizations and how you drive your employees.”

Given presidential pressure to reduce regulatory burdens and the fact that the CFPB’s mortgage rules have been criticized by financial industry participants and consumer advocates alike, the CFPB review of the key mortgage rules warrants close attention.

- Pavitra Bacon


Did You Know

Annual NMLS Mortgage Industry Report Posted

On March 28, 2017, the 2016 NMLS Mortgage Industry Report was posted. The report consists of data concerning companies, branches, and mortgage loan originators who are licensed or registered to conduct mortgage activities on NMLS. In summary, a few key data points include:

  • State-licensed mortgage companies grew 2.2 percent.

  • Licensed mortgage loan originators grew by 7.6 percent and the number of licenses held by MLOs grew by 19.4 percent.

  • Mortgage originations by state-licensed MLOs went up 20 percent from 2015.

  • Federally registered institutions have decreased by 4 percent and registered MLOs grew by 4 percent in 2016.

The full report can be found here.

Arkansas Amends Licensing Requirement Under Fair Mortgage Lending Act

Arkansas has made revisions to the Fair Mortgage Lending Act (FMLA) including, but not limited to:

  • In an application for licensure, an applicant and a managing partner of the applicant must include fingerprints for submission to the Federal Bureau of Investigation and any governmental agency or entity authorized to receive fingerprints for a state, national, and international criminal background check.

  • Each mortgage broker, mortgage banker, and mortgage servicer must post a surety bond as determined by the commissioner on a form deemed satisfactory to the commissioner. The bond must provide for suit on the bond by any person who has a cause of action under this chapter and cover claims for at least five years after the licensee ceases to provide mortgage services in this state or longer if required by the commissioner.

  • At the time a mortgage servicer accepts assignment of servicing rights for a mortgage loan in this state, the mortgage servicer shall disclose to the borrower the following: any notice required by the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act of 1974 and a notice in a clear and conspicuous form and content that the mortgage servicer is licensed in Arkansas and that complaints about the mortgage servicer may be submitted to the commissioner.

These provisions are effective on August 18, 2017 (or 91 days after adjournment of the current legislative session).

Utah Revises Residential Mortgage Practices and Licensing Act

Utah has made revisions to the Residential Mortgage Practices and Licensing Act (RMPLA) including, but not limited to:

  • Revising the definition of “business of residential mortgage loans” to include rendering services related to origination of a residential mortgage loan including receiving, collecting, or distributing information common for the processing or underwriting of a loan in the mortgage industry or communicating with a consumer to obtain information necessary for the processing or underwriting of a residential mortgage loan, unless exempt.

  • Adding a licensing exemption for a loan processor or loan underwriter who is not a mortgage loan originator when the loan processor or loan underwriter is employed by, and acting on behalf of, a person or entity licensed under this chapter; and under the direction of and subject to the supervision of a person licensed.  A loan processor or loan underwriter who is an independent contractor is not exempt.

  • Adding a prohibited conduct, that a person transacting the business of residential mortgage loans in Utah or an appraisal management company may not engage in any act or practice that violates appraisal independence as defined in 15 U.S.C. Sec. 1639e or in the policies and procedures of the Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation or the Federal National Mortgage Association.

  • Clarifying that a licensed entity must provide each quarterly report of condition to the nationwide database no later than 75 days after the last day of the reporting quarter.

These provisions are effective on May 8, 2017.

Utah to Adopt Safe MLO Test

Effective May 8, 2017, the Utah Division of Real Estate will adopt the National State MLO Test Component with Uniform State Content, becoming the 55th state agency to do so.  More information on the Uniform State Test (UST) Implementation can be found here.


Copyright © 2017 by Ballard Spahr LLP.
www.ballardspahr.com
(No claim to original U.S. government material.)

All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted in any form or by any means, including electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording, or otherwise, without prior written permission of the author and publisher.

This alert is a periodic publication of Ballard Spahr LLP and is intended to notify recipients of new developments in the law. It should not be construed as legal advice or legal opinion on any specific facts or circumstances. The contents are intended for general informational purposes only, and you are urged to consult your own attorney concerning your situation and specific legal questions you have.